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Abstract
Humans are a cooperative species, capable of altruism and the creation of shared
norms that ensure fairness in society. Yet, individuals with different educational, cultural,
economic, or ethnic backgrounds differ in their levels of social investment and
endorsement of egalitarian values. We present four experiments showing that subtle cues
to social status (i.e., prestige and reputation in the eyes of others) modulate prosocial
orientation. The experiments found that individuals who experienced low status showed
more communal and prosocial behavior, and endorsed more egalitarian life goals and
values compared to those who experienced high status. Behavioral differences across
high and low status positions start to appear early in human ontogeny (4-5 years of age).
33
Significance Statement
Even though humans are the most altruistic species, disparities in prosocial
orientation are common and occur across social groups that vary in education, sex roles,
biology, and financial resources. In the present research, using different manipulations of
social status -defined as the level of social prestige and reputation enjoyed by individuals
in the eyes of others– we show that mere incidental low status triggers a prosocial
orientation manifested in helping behavior, signaling communal intent, and the
endorsement of egalitarian goals and values. These effects start to appear early in human
ontogeny. The findings suggest that humans have basic cognitive and motivational
programs that they use flexibly as they navigate unstable hierarchies typical in human
societies.
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\body Social hierarchies are ubiquitous and can be found between individuals and
groups, be it between occupations, neighborhoods, social class, age and race groups. The
position individuals occupy in the social hierarchy has a marked influence on their
cognition and behavior. Members of disadvantaged social groups, such as ethnic
minorities, women and individuals with low socioeconomic status (SES), are socially
more attentive and affiliative compared to their advantaged counterparts (1, 2, 3). For
example, individuals with low SES can better identify the emotional states of others
compared to those with high SES (3). Immigrants have more complex and differentiated
social group perceptions than national citizens of the same socioeconomic background
(4). Ethnic minorities, such as Black people and Hispanics, are more interdependent and
less individualistic, compared to Caucasians (5). Women affiliate more and endorse more
benevolent values than men (2). Interestingly, rank differences in social investment have
also been observed in other primate species. Low rank monkeys and apes follow more the
gaze of others (especially of high rank animals), groom more, yield more space, show
more appeasing displays and less aggression than their high rank counterparts (6, 7). In
this article we test a new account for hierarchy differences in human social investment,
based on the causal effects of status independently of the specific contributions of
ethnicity, SES or gender.
The origins of hierarchical differences in social investment are multifaceted. They
can derive from differences in education, income, culture, opportunities to exercise
power, and the genome, all of which can impact social cognition and behavior. To
illustrate, during development, parents from low SES emphasize respect and conformity
in their children, whereas those at the high echelons emphasize self-direction (8). These
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differences can affect egalitarianism (9, 3), and subsequently the extent to which
individuals care for the welfare of others (3). Furthermore, high SES typically endows
individuals with financial resources, known to increase their social power (1, 10). Social
power refers to tangible control over others and resources, and increases the ability to
pursue organizational and personal goals (11), while decreasing the need to pay attention
and care for other individuals (12). Therefore, power holders are generally not prosocial
(13). It is therefore not surprising that income, a component of SES that affords power,
decreases benevolence or the extent to which individuals value the welfare of others (9).
In summary, individuals who differ in SES (similarly to those who differ in ethnicity or
gender), typically traverse a cluster of unique experiences throughout their lives that
jointly affect the extent to which they are oriented towards the needs and welfare of
others (1). These influences affect behavior through the application of mental operations,
such as the activation of goals and values, used to fulfil the needs of the individual in the
social context. A crucial task for social scientists is, therefore, to identify the core triggers
of the motivational programs that affect altruism. This is one of the aims of the present
article.
Across domains, hierarchical positions typically co-vary with social prestige,
reputation and esteem that individuals hold in the eyes of others, that is, their status (14).
For example, White people enjoy more social regard and are less discriminated against
than Black people, men attain more prestigious social positions than women, and people
with high SES benefit from higher deference and reputation than those with low SES (15,
16). Status differences are a common thread across these groups, and could underlie the
altruism differences found in correlational evidence. Here we hypothesize that status has
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a causal role in the extent to which individuals invest socially, and, in particular, the
extent to which they are prosocial, that is, benefit others and care for others’ wellbeing.
Importantly, status is a distinguishable component of hierarchy. For example, individuals
with high SES (e.g., bankers, the nouveau riche) and high power (e.g., dictators) are often
despised. Through experimental work we investigate status-specific determinants of
prosocial behavior and related mental representations, in different phases of human
development.
Status could play a role in altruism because of its privileged value in human
interactions, and the benefits of prosocial behavior. A great deal of research has shown
that humans need to be socially valued. Humans automatically track their evaluative rank
in social contexts, and identify another’s rank in incidental observations, as shown in
differential activity in the ventral striatum of the brain (17), as well as in physiology (18).
In performance domains, knowledge of one’s inferior status (or social evaluation) triggers
physiological threat responses in the perceiver (18). Implicit signals of low status in small
groups, via feedback about one’s lower performance in relation to others, temporarily
reduce the IQ, and lead to associated brain responses (amygdala and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, 19). In addition, temporarily induced changes in the relative prestige
and reputation of one’s social groups markedly affect self and intergroup perceptions, as
well as behavior (20).
In spite of the acknowledged importance of social prestige and reputation,
whether they affect prosocial behavior independently of factors associated with chronic
low status, such as education, culture, income, ethnicity or gender roles, remains largely
unknown. We propose that individuals automatically monitor their relative prestige and
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respect in social interactions as they navigate the social world, and that their position
modulates their prosocial behavior and related mental representations. Thus contrary to
the common notion that people differ in generosity and altruism based solely on their
background and personal dispositions, we propose that they also flexibly care for the
welfare and needs of others, depending on their prestige and reputation in the current
situation, which they eagerly monitor, even on the basis of incidental signals.
Furthermore, we predict that status affects the broad spectrum of behavior and cognition,
spanning from prosocial acts to signaling behavior, to life goals and values.
These predictions derive from the detrimental effects of low status for individuals,
and the compensatory benefits of prosocial behavior and egalitarian ideologies. Low
social status is associated with substantial disadvantages that hinder human’s optimal
social coordination strategies. Individuals with low status experience social
discrimination and ostracism (15, 16, 20), have less access to valuable social models to
learn from, and have less opportunities (14). Chronic low status, associated with low SES
or ethnic minority membership, leads to stress, decreased wellbeing and poor health,
including increased mortality (21), as well as cognitive underperformance when low
status is salient (15, 22).
Low status individuals could prioritize prosocial behavior and associated goals
and values as a way to regulate social interactions and construe a niche that best fits their
needs and counteracts their disadvantages. Niche construction is a process originally
documented in evolutionary biology whereby organisms change their environment in
ways that affect their fitness (23, 24).
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Prosocial behavior is a powerful signal of positive intentions and confers a
number of immediate benefits. Altruistic acts enhance status in the eyes of others (25),
increase the potential for support and coalition formation, and protect individuals from
ostracism and threat (23). Prosocial behavior could be particularly adaptive for low status
individuals, as a way to increase their status, social support and the possibility of forming
alliances.
Given that social rank affects social investment in nonhuman primates, in
humans, basic forms of status related social investment may not necessitate complex
social cognition, and could emerge early in ontogeny. This should be seen in rudimentary
prosocial acts, independently of moral reasoning and before values have been formed.
With increased cognitive abilities, in adulthood status could affect individuals in more
fundamental ways, transforming their planning, life goals and value systems. These
symbolic means are used to make sense of the social environment, guide behavior, and
create a socially shared reality.
We propose that incidental signals of low status automatically affect adult mental
representations, pulling individuals towards social fairness for all. This proposition
differs from the Machiavellian hypothesis of cognitive evolution (26), which posits that
cooperation evolved as a manipulative strategy to beat other group members in a complex
and competitive social environment. A change in life goals and values would not be
consistent with such self-serving, competitive strategies.
Status is freely afforded to individuals who have valuable attributes, such as
expertise and competence (27). Therefore, high status confers various advantages, such as
social support and easier access to opportunities. Given these advantages, high status
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individuals may invest in maintaining their hierarchical positions, for example, by
signaling competence and by endorsing and disseminating values that maintain the status
quo (16, 27).
Status related prosocial behavior could derive from the application of algorithms
that use cognitive and motivational specializations flexibly (28, 29), as individuals
navigate the dynamic social relations that characterize human societies. The nature of
prosocial behavior and underlying cognitive and motivational processes should vary
across the lifespan. For example, whereas preschool children could show rudimentary
forms of prosocial behavior and empathy that are not determined by moral considerations
and values (30, 31), adults could set long term goals, engage in signaling behavior, and
endorse values that help guide behavior (2, 9) and shape the social environment (23, 24).
Importantly, across levels of development low status should consistently increase
prosocial behavior – the crucial adaptive strategy to low status positions proposed here.
Four studies tested the hypotheses that low status increases prosocial behavior,
signaling of prosocial intentions, and benevolent life goals and values, and that the
behavioral effects of status are already present in preschool children. In adults, status was
manipulated by giving participants false feedback regarding their social prestige and
reputation, using a variety of methods established in past research. In preschool children
status was manipulated through ownership of a valuable resource that afforded prestige.
Upon the status manipulations, participants were given the opportunity to help a person in
need, report their life goals and values or interact in groups.
Study 1
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Study 1 examined unsolicited helping behavior in adults. Participants were 44
undergraduate students (9 male; mean age was 20.30, SD=2.58). They were randomly
assigned to the between-subjects condition status (high vs. low), by receiving false
feedback regarding the ranking of their department, in terms of prospective professional
prestige, in relation to other departments of the same university (see supplement for all
methodological details). In the high status condition participants read an article with a
table indicating that their department (i.e. Psychology) was ranked second among nine
departments. In the low status condition their department was ranked eighth. Helping
behavior was measured outside the laboratory after completion of cognitive tasks, and
after the study had allegedly ended. The experimenter, who was unaware of the status
conditions, pretended to accidentally drop a pack of 20 pens on the floor. The number of
pens that participants helped pick up from the floor was counted as a measure of
unsolicited helping behavior (32).
During what was allegedly the actual experiment participants completed a
central executive task and a lexical decision task. Executive functions (i.e., cognitive
functions that coordinate and manage information necessary for appropriate actions and
planning; 33) are often compromised in chronic low status group members (e.g., ethnic
minorities, women) particularly when their low status is salient (e.g., under stereotype
threat; 15, 22). The cognitive strain of low status could accentuate the need to establish
social bonds, and was therefore measured. The lexical decision task examined the
accessibility of constructs related to sociality (aggressive, sociable) and agency (efficient,
knowledgeable). After finishing, participants were dismissed, and the measure of helping
behavior was taken outside the laboratory.
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Results. Low status participants (M=14.45, SDs=1.43) helped the experimenter pick up
significantly more pens from the floor than high status participants (M=11.68, SD= 1.99),
t(42)=-5.31, p<.001, d=1.16. Enhanced prosocial behavior in low status individuals was
not dependent on the accessibility of agency or sociability constructs, nor central
executive ability. Nevertheless, similarly to chronic low status positions, momentary
states of low status taxed central executive functions (Ms=18.91 vs. 17.76; SDs=1.19 vs.
1.58), t(41)=2.70, p<.05, d=.72. Status did not affect differentially the relative
accessibility of agency and sociability, F(1,42)=.21, p=.64.
Study 2
Study 2 focused on behavior during social interactions with individuals of the
same rank level. Past research has extensively examined the signaling of dominance and
subordination, which occurs through open and expanded or constricted poses respectively
(23). Such signaling has emerged as a strategy to avoid costly fighting and conflict
escalation in agonistic encounters. Whereas dominance and subordination signaling are
functional in dominance (i.e., power) based hierarchies, we reasoned that prestige based
hierarchies would be associated with the signaling of prestige related and prosocial traits
that serve the adaptive strategies of high and low status individuals, as they manage the
impressions that others form of them. One strategy could consist in costly signaling (34)
or the signaling of behavior that is costly to the self. Such behavior can increase the
chances of being chosen as a sexual or coalition partner, and should be particularly
relevant for low status individuals. By showing the wish to please others and sacrifice
self-interest to benefit others, low status individuals could increase their perceived status
and more easily form alliances. Such behavior can be seen in chronic low status groups.
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For example, women, who typically occupy lower status positions in society than men,
tend to smile more and signal more appeasement in social interactions than men (35).
Furthermore, this tendency increases in times of threat (36).
The second strategy is associated with an emphasis on competence. High status is
often afforded to those who are competent (37). To maintain their status positions high
status individuals may signal competence. This may occur even if they are not necessarily
more competent.
Status related behavior strategies could contribute in part to the emergence of
stereotypes of high and low status groups. Disadvantaged social groups who do not
compete for resources (e.g., the elderly) are often perceived in paternalistic ways: warm
but not competent. In contrast, advantaged social groups (e.g., rich people) are perceived
by society at large as competent, but often not warm (27). Stereotypes can in part be
inductively learned from signaling behavior (38).
In Study 2, participants were assigned to a minimal high or a low status group,
and were asked to complete a decision making task. They then introduced themselves to
the group and engaged in a group discussion with same status partners. Participants were
videotaped by hidden cameras, and the videotapes were coded by trained observers.
Status was manipulated using a minimal group paradigm. Participants performed
a relatively meaningless visual task, and received bogus feedback about their group
standing compared to another group. They first estimated the number of dots on displays
(39), and were then randomly assigned into one of two perceptual styles (figural or
background). They were informed that one style allegedly performs better than the other
style on dot estimation tasks. Subsequently, participants completed an unrelated task in
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which they read information about potential apartments and roommates and chose an
apartment and a roommate. The roommates and apartments varied in number of positive
and negative attributes, so that decision making quality could be measured (40).
Participants were then invited to move and sit together with other participants of the same
style, introduce themselves to the group and discuss their roommate preferences.
Results. Given the strong association between status, competence and warmth in the
stereotypes held by society at large (27), we inspected whether status affected decision
making quality as a proxy for competence, and whether this was related to prosociality.
High status participants did not make better decisions compared to low status
participants, χ2(1, N =82)=.78, p=.37, nor did they differ in the types of attributes they
preferred in roommates, F(1, 80)=2.49, p=.13.
Four trained coders, who were unaware of status, rated group members on 14
attributes associated with social investment (e.g., number of smiles, supportive, friendly,
approachable, empathic, extrovert), competence (competent, knowledgeable, knows what
he/she is doing, capable), agency (takes initiative, task oriented) and self-enhancement
(signals high status).*1
Results. The 14 attributes were subjected to a principal component analysis to identify
status specific behavior signaling. This analysis revealed two factors accounting for 85%
of the variance in the variables. 2 One factor concerned communal and prosocial
behavior, and the other competence, agency and the signaling of status.
Figure 1
1 The average inter-rater reliability was r=.73 for the social and r=.63 for the competence dimensions.
2 The group was the unit of analysis for variables assessed after the groups were formed.
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As expected, type of signaling was dependent on status, F(1, 11)=17.82, p=.001,
η2p=.62. High status participants scored higher on competence and agency (M=.35,
SD=.69) than on prosociality (M =-.31, SD=.67), F(1,11)=8.19, p<.001, η2p=.43,
whereas low status participants showed the reverse pattern (Ms=-.32 vs. .36; SDs=.49 vs.
.38), F(1,11)=16.41, p=.002, η2p=.60. Crucially, low status participants displayed more
prosocial intent than high status participants, F(1, 11)=8.81, p=.01, η2p=.44, and high
status participants signaled more competence and agency than low status participants,
F(1,11)=4.85, p=.050, η2p=.31. In summary, low status participants showed more
communal and prosocial signaling during self-presentations and interactions with same
status individuals compared to high status participants. In contrast, high status
participants signaled competence, initiative, and elevated status. Competence signaling
occurred even though high status participants did not make decisions of better quality
regarding the topic under discussion compared to low status participants. The results of
this study are noteworthy considering the minimalistic nature of status differences
between the groups. They are consistent with research showing that high and low status
groups have often ambivalent stereotypes of warmth and competence (27). The results
point out that one reason for the prevalence of ambivalent stereotypes, thereby low status
groups are often perceived as warm but not competent and high status groups as
competent but not warm, could derive, among other factors, from inductive learning of
actual behavior.
Study 3
Members of disadvantaged social groups (e.g., females and individuals with low
income) endorse more benevolent life goals and values than their high status counterparts
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(e.g., males and individuals with high income; 2, 3, 9). Here we examined whether subtle
cues of an individual’s status position are capable of affecting values in a similar manner.
Low status individuals could strategically deploy prosocial behavior solely to
attain a number of direct benefits for the self. These could include attaining status or
favors driven by reciprocal altruism (41). Low status individuals could also aim at
forming coalitions to outwit the higher echelons, a behavior that would be consistent with
the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis of cognitive evolution (26). Contrary to these
claims we test the hypothesis that low status is associated with more altruistic motives,
seen in life goals and values.
Values convey what is important in life (2, 9). They are desirable trans-situational
goals that serve as guiding principles in life. Values motivate action and function as
standards of comparison when making judgments about actions. Importantly, different
values are not related randomly, some values are compatible and others are incompatible.
In particular, power values, which reflect the desire to achieve social status, prestige and
control over resources, conflict with self-transcendent values. Self-transcendent values
reflect concerns with helping and nurturing others, as well as seeking justice and
tolerance for all.
Values show some malleability and are susceptible to changes that serve
adaptation to the environment (42). Subtle variations in status could change values in
ways that serve status-specific adaptation. Specifically, we hypothesized that a low status
position would increase self-transcendent values (universalism and benevolence) and
decreased power values, whereas the opposite should be true for a high status position.
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Status should also affect more concrete cognitive representations, specifically life
goals. Life goals are contextualized intentions that can be considered at a middle level
between values and concrete goals (43). We examined effects of status on the major
seven life goals (economic, aesthetic, social, relationship, political, hedonistic and
religious). We hypothesized that low status would be associated with the pursuit of
professions that serve the community more than high status. Finally, we also explored
whether status would affect the desire for offspring, as a form of social investment.
Fertility is higher in low social classes and minorities (44, 45). Given the increased
mortality in some of these groups, increasing the number of offspring would increase
social capital, and could be used as a strategy to increase fitness (46).
Fifty undergraduate art students (11 males) were randomly assigned to a high or
low status condition via false feedback regarding the prestige ranking of their school
compared to a similar school. This information was conveyed in a bogus article that
compared two schools of art. For half of the participants their school scored higher than
the similar school (high status condition) in a national assessment exercise, whereas for
the other half their school scored lower than that school (low status condition).
Participants subsequently completed the major life goals questionnaire (43). The social
domain entails prosocial goals: helping others in need, working to promote the welfare of
others and taking part in volunteer community and public service. Participants also
completed a short version of the universal, benevolent and power values subscales of the
Schwartz Value Survey (47).
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Desire for offspring entailed two questions: how many children participants plan
to have, and how many they would like to have if they could, in their fantasy (from 0 to
6).
Results. High status participants endorsed more power values (M=.14, SD=.64) than self-
transcendent values (M=-.18, SD=.64), low status participants endorsed more self-
transcendent (M=.17, SD=.55) than power (M=-.13, SD=.62) values, F(1,48)=8.74,
p=005, η2p=.15. Furthermore, low status participants endorsed more self-transcendent
values than high status participants, F(1,49)=4.21, p<.05, η2p=.08, but did not differ with
regard to power values. Status also affected prosocial life goals, F(1,48)=5.44, p=.02,
η2p=.10, but not goals in other life domains. Low status participants set more goals for
their lives that enhanced the welfare of others (M=5.39, SD=.92) compared to high status
participants (M=4.65, SD=1.27).
Figure 2
Finally, even though temporarily induced status differences did not affect the
actual number of children planned for the future, it affected the number of desired
children, F(1,47)=5.46, p=.02, η2p=.10. Low status participants wished for more children
(M=3.08, SD=1.32) than high status participants (M=2.20, SD=.93). Together, these
results suggest that status has far reaching consequences for the organization of people’
goals and abstract guiding principles. It affects life goals and values in ways that fit the
adaptive priorities of high and low status individuals, with an emphasis on prosocial
investment and increased social capital in low status individuals. These results suggest
that the effects of status are not solely related to wanting to attain reciprocal immediate
benefits for the self. Status affects individuals in more fundamental ways.
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Study 4
An appreciation of the evolutionary origins of social behavior is aided by an
understanding of how social cognition emerges in early development. Study 4 was
designed to this end. It focused on preschool children, an age before abstract
representations, such as values have started to form (which occurs at 7-8 years of age,
28). Hierarchies in children up to the age of 7 are based on coercion, and revolve around
disputes about property ownership and other forceful behaviors (48).
The study utilized a paradigm designed to study dominance based hierarchies in
nonhuman primates (49). This paradigm allows an examination of the prosocial correlates
of individual differences in social status, as well as the effects of manipulated social
status on prosocial behavior, without using high order symbolic means associated with
adult hierarchies. Forty-eight participants (28 male) took part. Mean age was 4.7
(SD=.56). Two children of the same age and gender were presented with a valued and a
non-valued toy, and asked to choose one each. The winner of the competition for the
valued toy was considered the dominant child. To force a change in status children were
regrouped in pairs two weeks later with a new partner of the same rank, constituting pairs
of either two high status, dominant or two low status, submissive children. The pair
competed again for the valuable toy, and new hierarchies emerged. Because dominance
and empathy in preschool children have been related to cognitive functions (50, 51), and
prosocial behavior often depends on moral reasoning (52), we measured the ability to
inhibit dominant responses and moral reasoning. To measure helping behavior, children
were given 5 stickers, and asked if they wish to donate any of these stickers to a child
who is in hospital and has no stickers (52). Moral reasoning was assessed by asking
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children to imagine themselves transgressing moral norms (e.g., stealing a bicycle), and
asking them about whether the transgressions were right or wrong, and what were the
emotions elicited in the self and other. Inhibition was measured with a modified Stroop
task and a measure of distractor inhibition.
Results. Helping was dependent on status and time (T), F(1,44)=4.30, p=.01, η2p=.23. As
expected, at T1 low status children donated more stickers to a child in need than high
status children (Ms=1.17 vs. .37; SDs=1.57 vs. .71). Furthermore, losing status increased
donations over time, F(1, 11)=6.06, p=.03, η2p=.34 (MT1 =.58 vs. MT2 =1.33; SDs=.90
vs. 1.43); whereas gained status had the reverse effect (MT1 =1.08 vs. MT2 =.33;
SDs=1.44 vs. .65), F(1, 11)=3.34 p=.09, η2p=.38. Thus a manipulated change in status at
T2 yield the same effects as dispositional status observed at T1. Nevertheless, for those
who maintained the same status positions over time there was a normalization of helping
behavior. When facing the same request, recurrent low status children helped more than
recurrent high status children at time 1 (Ms 1.25 vs. .17; SD=1.76 vs..39) but the
differences between these two groups became non-significant at T2, F(1, 22)=.11, ns.
Helping behavior was not related to differences in moral reasoning, distractor
inhibition and cognitive control. Status did not affect moral reasoning and Stroop
performance. There was a tendency for distractor inhibition to decrease over time for
individuals who acquired power at T2, however, none of the pairwise comparisons were
significant for this measure.
Discussion
Four studies demonstrated that status affects prosocial behavior in preschool
children and adults. Preschool children, who dispositionally or situationally experienced
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low status were more likely to help a child in need compared to those who experienced
high status, even though helping was costly. Low status adults were more likely to
spontaneously assist another person, and signal altruistic intent in interactions compared
to their high status counterparts. In contrast, high status individuals were more likely to
signal competence.
The prosocial behavior of preschool children was not associated with differences
in moral reasoning. In adults, status permeated higher order mental representations,
affecting values and the goals that individuals set for their lives, as well as their desire for
offspring. Low status individuals planned for more professional careers that serve the
community, and endorsed more benevolent and universal values compared to high status
individuals. These findings are consistent with research carried out in natural settings (1,
2, 16). For example, feelings of superiority of one’s group are associated with rightwing
ideology, and the justification of right-wing motivated violence (53). Prestige differences
could play an important role in such phenomena observed in social hierarchies.
Humans are a cooperative species, and humans’ superior altruism appears early in
ontogeny. For example, children as young as 3 years of age act more altruistically,
sharing resources more equitably with conspecifics compared to chimpanzees (54).
Research has started to unravel the nature of altruism in children. Altruism in preschool
children has been understood as being largely determined by age. Some studies have,
however, suggested that children’s prosocial behavior is sensitive to contextual factors,
such as reciprocity (55). Here we show for the first time that prosocial behavior in
preschool children is influenced by chronic and situational status positions. This pattern
of relations between social hierarchy and altruism occurred before children had acquired
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literacy and complex forms of moral reasoning and social cognition, and before they had
formed values that could guide behavior. These findings are consistent with the increased
social investment found in low rank nonhuman primates (6, 7).
The findings occurred in association with varied situational cues indicative of
relative interpersonal or intergroup prestige and reputation, including minimalistic cues.
They point out the importance of social status in human social relations, and suggest that
individuals have cognitive and motivational programs that they use flexibly to navigate a
complex social world characterized by unstable status relations.
From a broader perspective, the ability to detect and act appropriately upon status
cues could have been under evolutionary pressure, and have emerged to solve status
related challenges. In particular, benevolence and affiliative behavior may have been an
adaptive strategy for those in low status positions. In ancestral environments cooperative
behavior has allowed humans better prospects in food gathering, mate opportunities and
defense against challenges (56). In today’s society, an investment in social relationships
is positively associated with household food security, independent of household-level
socioeconomic factors (57). Similarly, in nonhuman primates, such as baboons and
chimpanzees, bonding behavior and the signaling of appeasement intentions increase
reproductive fitness, and seem to have emerged as an adaptive strategy to deal with social
threat (6, 37). Individual differences in bonding behavior positively correlate with life
span in nonhuman primates (57, 58). Crucially, affiliative behaviors are amenable to
social contextual influences, and increase in times of uncertainty both in nonhuman
primates and in humans (6, 37).
22
22
In the present research status affected not only behavior but also long term goals
and values systems that concern society at large. The heightened endorsement of
benevolent values by low status individuals is inconsistent with the notion that low status
individuals are solely motivated to cooperate in order to outwit their higher echelons in a
competitive environment. Thus the present findings cast doubts on the Machiavellian
intelligence hypothesis of cognitive evolution (26).
Values are communicated and shared, and can be used to exert social control. The
values of low status individuals seek equality for all, and will contribute to create
egalitarian cultures that treat all people as moral equals, committed to cooperate and
show concern for everybody’s welfare. Conversely, by endorsing power values those
with high status will favor hierarchical cultures. Ultimately, both strategies reflect
attempts of niche construction in the form of norms that govern social life.
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